Recommendable!
"... By mid-1953, Iran no longer had a functioning legislature. A leader committed to constitutionalism was governing largely by decree.
Support fractured. Sections of the middle class drifted away. Senior military officers grew hostile. Clerical allies recoiled, worried about disorder and the growing influence of the communist Tudeh Party. Ayatollah Abul-Qasim Kashani, once a key partner in the nationalist movement, openly broke with Mosaddeq. These developments were not the product of foreign manipulation alone—they reflected a domestic political breakdown. ...
Foreign intelligence services did intervene. Britain and the United States authorized a covert effort to remove Mosaddeq, and that fact is not in dispute. What is often overstated is how decisive that intervention proved to be. The initial attempt failed. Mosaddeq rejected the Shah’s dismissal decree, arrested its couriers, and the Shah fled the country. Both Washington and London believed the operation had unraveled. ...
The Islamic Revolution did not overthrow a functioning democracy; it replaced a system that had lost the confidence of nearly every constituency. Liberals lacked organization, the left lacked trust, nationalists lacked unity, and the monarchy lacked credibility. Only the clergy possessed nationwide networks, disciplined leadership, and a moral language that resonated across classes. ..."
Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882 - 1967), Iranian Prime Minister in 1951
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