Monday, February 28, 2022

India’s stake in the Ukraine conflict

Recommendable! History is never pure and simple. India is a case in point! 

"... India’s abstention [on the UN Security Council vote] was less welcome and puzzled as well as disappointed many Indophiles. Ukraine’s ambassador to India, Igor Polikha, expressed deep dissatisfaction with India’s vague generalities and boilerplate statements on an immediate ceasefire, dialogue and respect for legitimate interests of all sides, rather than specific and strong condemnation of Russian aggression. India’s special relationship with Russia, he said, made it one of the few countries that could shape Moscow’s policy.
To understand why India abstained, we must look at the complex array of India’s principles and interests that are engaged in the Ukraine crisis. To begin with, this includes the presence of around 18,000 Indian students in Ukraine. Under contemporary conditions of India’s noisy electronic media, no government in New Delhi can afford not to be sensitive to their welfare and, if necessary, safe evacuation.
India has traditionally portrayed itself as a global champion of the inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity on behalf of developing countries against once-colonial powers and weak against strong countries. Russia’s brutal and full-scale invasion violates this foundational Indian foreign-policy value as well as strong material interest, given its own many restive regions, in opposing foreign powers dismembering existing states. 
That said, Moscow has historically been a major diplomatic ally that has often in the past protected New Delhi’s back in the Security Council. Russia remains India’s most important arms supplier, accounting for almost half of total arms imports (and 23% of total Russian arms exports—its biggest market) in the 2016 to 2020 period. Israel, France and the US are the second, third and fourth biggest sources.
Yet, because India is trying to reduce its dependence on Russia by diversifying arms imports, Russia’s share dropped by half from 70% to 49% from 2011–2015 to 2016–2020. US imports also fell by 46% and those from France and Israel went up by 709% and 82%, respectively, in the same five-year periods. Moreover, in recent years Russia has also become Pakistan’s second biggest arms supplier, albeit still only a fraction of China’s dominant share.
The bigger defence-cum-diplomatic worry for India is the developing Moscow–Beijing axis. China gets 77% of its arms from Russia. Shortly before the Ukraine invasion, China and Russia announced a ‘no-limits partnership’ that includes supporting each other’s policies on Ukraine and Taiwan. For all these reasons, India would be wary of contributing to any further consolidation of the Moscow–Beijing axis, either by the West or by its own actions...."

India’s stake in the Ukraine conflict | The Strategist

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