I am not sure how serious this is, but it looks like Apple did not catch this mistake. More such mistakes and the nimbus of Apple may suffer.
"[The] novel hardware attack, called PACMAN, shows that pointer authentication can be defeated without even leaving a trace. Moreover, PACMAN utilizes a hardware mechanism, so no software patch can ever fix it. ..."
From the abstract:
"... We leverage speculative execution attacks to bypass an important memory protection mechanism, ARM Pointer Authentication... We present PACMAN, a novel attack methodology that speculatively leaks PAC verification results via micro-architectural side channels without causing
any crashes. Our attack removes the primary barrier to conducting control-flow hijacking attacks on a platform protected using Pointer Authentication.
We demonstrate multiple proof-of-concept attacks of PACMAN
on the Apple M1 SoC, the first desktop processor that supports ARM
Pointer Authentication. We reverse engineer the TLB hierarchy on
the Apple M1 SoC and expand micro-architectural side-channel
attacks to Apple processors. Moreover, we show that the PACMAN
attack works across privilege levels, meaning that we can attack
the operating system kernel as an unprivileged user in userspace."
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