Always remember David and Goliath! Taiwan may attack the Three Gorges Dam (or other critical infrastructure) and/or Chinese population centers, if the Communist Party of China intends to invade Taiwan.
Taiwan may also destroy e.g. its TSMC plants and so on.
"... Ultimately, these disagreements and factors all boil down to one overarching question: What most scares the Chinese Communist Party? ...
Alternatively, the focus of deterrence by punishment “is not the direct defense of the contested commitment but rather threats of wider punishment that would raise the cost of an attack.” Taiwan’s interest in acquiring long-range, “deep strike” platforms is a reflection of this, as a less extreme version of the 2004-era “whisper” campaign (one occasionally revived since) of Taiwanese contingency planning for a strike on China’s Three Gorges Dam (三峽大壩). The logic here is that threatening the CCP with strikes on major targets beyond the immediate battlefield would: (1) raise the threat to senior Party members’ personal safety; (2) threaten vast disruption in the Chinese domestic economy; and (3) increase the risk of social unrest and the long-term economic costs from the effects of war, even in the case of an operationally successful Taiwan campaign. ..."
The two classic Western approaches to deterrence are deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The deterrence by denial strategy “seeks to deter an action by denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives.” Broadly speaking, Western advocates for a Taiwan asymmetric “porcupine strategy” adhere to this method for deterrence, under the logic that increasing Taiwanese operational lethality and survivability will: (1) raise the perceived costs on the PLA of a potential invasion; and (2) provide time for the United States to intervene and tip the balance of power in Taiwan’s favor.
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