Recommendable! Afghanistan remains at the crossroads of foreign ambitions and transit routes. Let's not forget that Afghanistan is rich in natural resources, which could make this country and its people prosperous under good government.
I don't share the opinion of the article's author that it is a "harsh reality of a Vietnam-like retreat" for the U.S. with regards to Afghanistan. Actually, this comparison is quite wrong: The Vietnam War severely divided American society, the Afghanistan war did not.
"The only country with a major stake in the future of Afghanistan that is unhappy with the American decision [to leave Afghanistan] is India—and for very good reasons. India has already pumped US$3 billion since 2001 in developmental assistance into Afghanistan in order to prevent the exact scenario that is emerging now. ...
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to India tried to paper over the cracks between American and Indian perceptions of the future of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was at the top of the agenda during Blinken’s talks with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, which ended with the bland statement that India and the US ‘largely see Afghanistan in the same light. We’re both committed to the proposition that there is no military solution to the conflict that afflicts Afghanistan.’ This meaningless declaration ignores the fact that after withdrawal neither Washington nor New Delhi has any means of preventing a power grab in Afghanistan or a takeover of the country by the Taliban. ...
India faces a quandary in terms of its policy towards Afghanistan. India was opposed to the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001 primarily because it saw it as a tool of Pakistani policy in two spheres. First, a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul was expected to provide Islamabad defence in depth in times of future conflict with India, thus to some extent neutralising India’s conventional-power superiority. Second, Afghanistan under the Taliban had become a safe haven for Pakistani and Pakistan-trained terrorists that Islamabad deployed on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir in an effort both to make the state of Jammu and Kashmir ungovernable and to divert substantial Indian military capabilities into fighting the insurgency and keeping order in Kashmir. This is why India supported and secretly armed the Northern Alliance that was fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. ...
India is worried not only about Pakistan’s increasing clout in Afghanistan but also about potential moves by India’s other nemesis, China, in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, especially in light of Beijing’s interest in roping in Afghanistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. A meeting between a Taliban delegation and the Chinese foreign minister on 28 July in China has heightened these concerns. In the meeting, Mullah Baradar, who led the Taliban delegation, called Beijing a ‘trustworthy friend’ and said that the group wouldn’t permit ‘anyone to use’ Afghanistan’s territory. The reference to ‘anyone’ was obviously meant to reassure China that the Taliban won’t allow insurgent Uyghur groups already active in Afghanistan to use the country to attack targets in China. Incidentally, this meeting followed a joint statement issued by the Pakistani and Chinese foreign ministers on 24 July that the two countries will coordinate their policies and closely cooperate on Afghanistan, further adding to Indian apprehensions. ..."
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to India tried to paper over the cracks between American and Indian perceptions of the future of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was at the top of the agenda during Blinken’s talks with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, which ended with the bland statement that India and the US ‘largely see Afghanistan in the same light. We’re both committed to the proposition that there is no military solution to the conflict that afflicts Afghanistan.’ This meaningless declaration ignores the fact that after withdrawal neither Washington nor New Delhi has any means of preventing a power grab in Afghanistan or a takeover of the country by the Taliban. ...
India faces a quandary in terms of its policy towards Afghanistan. India was opposed to the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001 primarily because it saw it as a tool of Pakistani policy in two spheres. First, a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul was expected to provide Islamabad defence in depth in times of future conflict with India, thus to some extent neutralising India’s conventional-power superiority. Second, Afghanistan under the Taliban had become a safe haven for Pakistani and Pakistan-trained terrorists that Islamabad deployed on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir in an effort both to make the state of Jammu and Kashmir ungovernable and to divert substantial Indian military capabilities into fighting the insurgency and keeping order in Kashmir. This is why India supported and secretly armed the Northern Alliance that was fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. ...
India is worried not only about Pakistan’s increasing clout in Afghanistan but also about potential moves by India’s other nemesis, China, in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, especially in light of Beijing’s interest in roping in Afghanistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. A meeting between a Taliban delegation and the Chinese foreign minister on 28 July in China has heightened these concerns. In the meeting, Mullah Baradar, who led the Taliban delegation, called Beijing a ‘trustworthy friend’ and said that the group wouldn’t permit ‘anyone to use’ Afghanistan’s territory. The reference to ‘anyone’ was obviously meant to reassure China that the Taliban won’t allow insurgent Uyghur groups already active in Afghanistan to use the country to attack targets in China. Incidentally, this meeting followed a joint statement issued by the Pakistani and Chinese foreign ministers on 24 July that the two countries will coordinate their policies and closely cooperate on Afghanistan, further adding to Indian apprehensions. ..."
No comments:
Post a Comment